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Abstract 
at Searle called 
brute facts, but rather the social acts and institutional facts, whose existence is observer-dependent. As Searle himself put it 
more than ten years ago, philosophy needs to break the recurring bifurcation of the mental and physical, as they are both part 
of the same single world. This theory, which is recurrent in most of his recent work and is at the foundations of his social 
ontology, is stated from an evolutionary perspective; whereas the philosophy of the 20th century revolved mainly around 
language and logic  both as methods and subjects  the 21st century will bring about a series of changes, namely the 
transmutation of focus towards social interactions.  
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be a subject of interest for contemporary philosophers. 
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1. peech acts and collective intentionality 
The contemporary society, whether we refer to the political agenda or the media spectacle, is an intricate web 
ard what Searle called brute facts [1]  
with a natural, observer-independent existence  but rather the social acts and institutional facts, whose existence 
is observer-dependent. As Searle himself put it more than ten years ago, philosophy needs to break the recurring 
mental and physical bifurcation, as they are both part of the same single world [2]. This theory, which is recurrent 
in most of his recent work and is at the foundation of his social ontology, is stated from an evolutionary 
perspective; whereas the philosophy of the 20th century revolved mainly around language and logic  both as 
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methods and subjects  the 21st century will bring about a series of changes, namely the transmutation of focus 
towards social interactions.  
This paper aims to refl
why this should be a subject of interest for contemporary philosophers. 
1.1. Language and social ontology 
In trying to explain social institutions, Searle claims that the main question one has to ask is: how can we talk 
about society, in general, and social institutions, in particular, as objective realities, if their existence depends on 
our recognition and acceptance? For example, how can we assert that money is an objective reality, if, in order to 
be money, a piece of paper or metal needs someone to give it that quality? There is a class of entities and reality 
that have an objective existence even though they are created by human subjectivity [3]. Money, marriage, 
parties, universities, vacations, all these are only a few of those special entities that not only occupy a big part of 
our lives, but they impose certain attitudes, obligations and types of behaviour. Human subjectivity creates a 
certain kind of objectivity, which is a real interesting phenomenon that needs special attention.  
,  he says [1]. Moreover, in order to create social 
realities that are accepted and recognized by others, you need meaning and convention. That being said, language 
does not only have a descriptive role. It does not merely describe different realities, but it also constitutes some, 
meaning that is accepted and recognized. Language itself is a social institution. Moreover, as Searle puts it, 
language is the fundamental human institution, because it makes it possible for other social institutions to exist. 
 a new reality is born: the institution of marriage. 
When one makes a promise, an obligation is created and so on and so forth. How does this work? According to 
performed only in virtue of the collective recognition of the object or person as having a certain status, which 
Searle calls status-function. We call a man a president, only because he is collectively recognized as having that 
but it is something we assign to him, by means of speech acts. If we understand how people create these status-
functions, Searle says, we can understand how people create human civilization.  
f the following logical apparatus, which is a 
simplified form of applying a set of constitutive rules: 
 
X counts as Y in C 
 
that means a reality X counts as a new reality Y, in a certain context and in certain conditions [1].  
All of human institutional reality is created by repeated applications of this form, when we count something as 
having a certain status. In other words, Y becomes a new X, which then becomes a new Y in another context. But 
what if you have no X, no pre-existing term? For example, corporations are entities that have no physical reality 
at all, they are purely abstract. In some cases, this also applies to money: the money in the bank, the money on 
the credit card etc. Those are only representations of money. So, the question that arises is: how can you create an 
institutional fact of this kind out of thin air?  
The explanation relies in what Searle calls the direction of fit between language and reality [4]. There are three 
possibilities, regarding this direction of fit: word  to  world (as we have in descriptions and assertions), world  
to  word (as we have in directives and commissives) and the double direction of fit  world to word and word to 
world, as we have in declarations. In declarations, one uses a verb by means of which it changes reality so that it 
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matches that verb. In other words, in declarations, one creates a reality by representing that reality as existing. 
That being said, assigning a status function of this kind (with no X term) can be reduced to this simple form: 
 
We make it the case by declaration that a Y status function exists in C and in doing so we create a relation R 
between Y and a certain person or persons, S, such that in virtue of SRY, S has the power to perform acts (of 
type) A. 
 
 Continuous linguistic representations that have this logical structure maintain these social institutions. That is 
why, Searle says, when we have to do with social change, the vocabulary is the first to be affected. 
1.2. Collective intentionality and social ontology 
As we stated earlier, there could not be any successful assignments of status-functions if there was no 
collective acceptance and recognition. Thus, status-functions depend on what Searle calls collective 
intentionality, which is maybe one of the most controversial concept of his entire theory. Whenever one says or 
thinks ,  we have to do with a special kind of 
intentionality, which is no longer individual, but collective. Although it could seem that the only difference 
between the individual and collective intentionality is one of linguistic nature (a transition from first person 
singular to first person plural), Searle insists that this is not remotely true. To make things clear, he makes a list 
of conditions of adequacy that any case of collective intentionality has to meet. I will write them down exactly as 
they are stated in Making the social world. The Structure of Human Civilization [1]: 
 
 We must have a clear distinction between prior intentions and intentions in action. 
 We need to make it absolutely clear that the conditions of satisfaction of both prior intentions and intentions in 
action are causally self-referential. 
  
 In case of collective intentionality, we have to distinguish what I can individually cause, that which could be 
the condition of satisfaction of my intentional content, and that which I take for granted as contributed by my 
collaborators in the collective intentionality. 
 In the specification of the conditions of satisfaction, we must be clear what can go in the propositional content 
and what cannot. The propositional content can only represent the condition of satisfaction of the intention. 
 In collective intention
intentionali  to believe is that they share a collective goal and 
intend to do their part in achieving the goal. 
 
In other words, there are two main aspects of collective intentionality that have to be kept in mind: firstly, this 
kind of intentionality only applies to collaborative activities, whether they imply getting a certain thing done or 
just assigning a status-functio
place to dispose of it. The difference is that when dealing with collective intentionality, besides mutual goal and 
mutual knowledge, the members of a certain group or community act according to a pact  be it written, spoken 
or passed throughout generations. In order to support this point of view, Searle gives the famous example of 
a few problems, which I will bring up  
later. Shortly, these are the two situations that he uses as examples: 
1.2.1. Example 1 
hand, according to which selfish behaviour contributes to the common good. In trying to follow this idea, each 
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graduate lives as selfishly as possible in order to help humanity. Each of them knows that the others are doing it 
too, so there is a common goal and common knowledge, but Searle says that in this case we have no collective 
intentionality.  
1.2.2. Example 2 
hand, according to which selfish behaviour contributes to the common good. On graduation day, they all come 
together and make a pact that they will each be as selfish as they can and become as rich as possible in order to 
help humanity. In this case, Searle says, we have to do with real cooperation and collective intentionality. The 
difference is made by the existing pact and the obligations born with it. 
 
So, one would understand from this account that we deal with collective intentionality whenever we have two 
or more people that make a promise or a pact to collaborate in order to achieve a common goal. However, later 
on in the same chapter, Searle says that language is not necessary for collective intentionality to exist. Moreover, 
he claims that there is a pre-linguistic sort of collective intentionality, a Background capacity, and that when two 
people engage in a conversation, they already have collective intentionality [1]. But he does not explain why this 
Invisible Hand example, Searle claims that the difference is given by the existence of a pact. In both cases we 
have a common goal and common knowledge, but the promise to cooperate makes the difference. What kind of 
promise or cooperation is there when I ask someone for directions, for example? And how come we can even 
bring about a pact, in absence of language? Searle himself says: 
 e 
individual intentions to  [1].  
So, what is it that is missing? Later on, Searle gives an explanation: in order to engage in a collective 
behaviour, one has to believe (assume or presuppose) that others are cooperating with him or her, and 
-in-
but not necessarily the same means to achieve this goal [1]. If for example, we have a team of two people 
cooperating, eac   
If this is the case, then I think the two examples with the Harvard graduates are not strong enough, because, in 
the first situation, when the students have common knowledge and a common goal, it seems to me that it could be 
possible that they expected the others to act so that they achieve that common goal. So there could be a case of 
 
1.3. Cooperation, collective recognition and the imposition of functions  
institutions, is a weaker form of collective intentionality and should not be confused with cooperation. For 
example, when we have a buying process, we have to deal with cooperation, but the attitude towards the piece of 
plastic which is the credit card is collective recognition. Collective recognition does not necessarily involve 
active cooperation and does not imply acceptance. In cases of totalitarianism, for example, the authority of the 
state is collectively recognized, but that does not mean everyone agrees with this kind of political ideology.  
Collective recognition  not cooperation  is what helps humans assign the status-functions we talked about 
earlier and impose certain behaviours. Collectively recognized status-functions create obligations, rights, duties, 
authorizations, in two words, deontic powers. This is not a physical power, it is a power imposed by language and 
mutual recognition. These two factors create what Searle calls desire-independent reasons for action. One does 
not act as one wishes in a social institution  different social realities impose different rules of behaviour. 
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According to Searle, a function is a cause that serves a purpose; they are intentionality-relative and mind-
dependent. And status-functions make no exception.  
Collective recognition not only creates institutional facts, but maintains them. As long as people collectively 
recognize a certain reality, the deontic system will work, because there will be reasons for actions. This is how it 
works: 
 
We make it the case by declaration that a Y status function exists in C and in doing so we create a relation R 
between Y and a certain person or persons, S, such that in virtue of SRY, S has the power to perform acts (of 
type) A 
and 
We collectively recognize (Y exists in C and because (SRYS (S has the power (S does A)))). [1] 
 
 
Why do we accept a political regime that we do not like? Why do we accept a law we do not approve of? Why do 
non-religious people baptize their children? Searle says some of the reasons for this type of attitude might be 
conformism, self-interest or even ignorance. I would add that in some cases  especially as far as politics is 
concerned  the acceptance comes from lack of education, manipulation or even fear.  
1.4.  
Althoug The main 
critics aiming his theory regard the concept of collective intentionality. Some philosophers reject the entire 
concept and assert that collective intentionality can actually be reduced to a sum of individual intentionality, 
these points of view: 
1.4.1.  
Margaret Gilbert agrees to Searle to the extent that there is such thing as a collective intentionality and that it 
is fundamental to creating and maintaining the social facts [5], but she accuses him of not offering enough 
arguments to support his idea of a primitive collective intentionality, that exists even in the case of a brain kept in 
a vat, as he stated in one of his earlier works [6].  
She also remarks that collective intentionality needs some external facts besides what is going on in 
For example, she says [5], if a man declares he intends to marry a woman, believing that this 
is also her intention and he actually has misinterpreted her behaviour, we no longer have a case of collective 
intentionality. Gilbert states that you need more than intentions to cooperate, you also need proof for these 
intentions; otherwise, there is no collective intentionality involved. 
1.4.2.  
Seumas ist 
perspective. Miller states that any group is only a sum of members and that there is no such thing as a collective 
agent, with distinct characteristics and intentions. For Miller, any collective action is in fact a sum of individual 
actions, connected by certain relations [7]. He even puts together a theory, calledThe Collective End Theory, 
which explains collective actions  or joint actions, as he calls them  as individual actions aimed to the same 
purpose.  
According to Miller, two individual actions x and y performed by individuals A and B, in a situation S can be 
considered a joint action if and only if: 
1. A intentionally performs x in s and B intentionally performs y in s. 
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2. A x-s in s if and only if (he believes) B has y-ed, is y-ing or will y in s and B y-s in s if and only if (he 
believes) A x-s or is x-ing or will x in s. 
3. A has end e, and A x-s in s in order to realize e and B has end e, and B y-s in s in order to realize e. 
4. A and B each mutually truly believes that A has performed, is performing or will perform x in s and that B 
has performed, is performing or will perform y in s. 
Each agent mutually truly believes (2) and (3). 
 
These actions can take place simultaneously, at the same place, or they can be kilometres or centuries apart 
from each other. As we can see, Miller does not think, as Gilbert, that the intentions to cooperate need 
confirmation in behavior; the mere belief is for him, as it is for Searle, enough. However, for Miller only the goal 
is collective, anything else being individual. 
1.5. Towards a Philosophy of the Society 
In the twenty first century we will feel a pressing need for what should be called a freestanding philosophy 
of society. one 
really gave much importance before. Money, citizenship, elections, jobs, vacations and parties have never been 
Moreover, language itself has always been somehow taken for granted. 
However, no one can deny that these aspects occupy the biggest part of our lives and affect our well-being. In 
order to understand politics, corruption or economic recession, we need to understand what kind of realities these 
are and how they function. Furthermore, as we have already seen, institutional facts also raise a lot of interesting 
questions. Searle manages to answer most of them, but not thoroughly. Some concepts remain controversial  as 
it is the case of collective intentionality - and some of the explanations are not complete  as were the reasons 
why people collectively accept an institution they do not like or respect.  
Searle says that a philosophy of society would enable us to ask and answer specific questions about specific 
social realities and institutions in a way that traditional philosophy is unable to do. Furthermore, he claims that a 
philosophy of society will help us understand how institutions coexist so harmoniously with the brute facts; how 
we can have stones and political parties and treat them both as objective realities; how power and authority work 
at an interpersonal level and how they can be regulated. A philosophy of society will help us better understand 
and foresee political and social change. And in such a dynamic and instable world as the one that we live in, I 
think this kind of approach would be more than welcome. 
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